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PEOPLE tI. SHIPMAN

[Crim. No. 8365. In Bank. Jan. 15, 1965.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v.
RICHARD SHIPMAN, Defendant and Appellant.
[la, 1b] Oriminal Law-Writ of Error Ooram Nobil~lho'1lD.C18.-·o'.
A writ of coram nobis is granted only when the petitioner
shows that some fact existed which, without his fault or
negligence, was not presented to the trial court on the merits,
and if presented. would have prevented rendition of the judg- .
ment, that the newly discovered evidence does not go to the
merits of issues tried, and that he did not know and could not
have discovered with due diligence the facts on which he,
relies substantially sooner than the time of his motion for the
writ.
[2] Id.-Writ of Error Ooram Nobfs.-.:.Grounds.-The requirement·
of showing in a petition for a writ of coram nobis that newly'
discovered evidence does not go to the merits of issues tried
applies even though the evidence is not discovered until
the time to move for a new trial has elapsed or the motion
been denied.
[3] Id.-Writ of Error Ooram Nobis-Proceedings.-When facta
are alleged with sufficient particularity to show that there are
substantial legal or factual issues on which availability of the.
writ of coram nobis turns, the court must set the matter for
hearing.
'
[4] ld.-Writ of Error Ooram Nobis-Proeeedings.-Legal or
tual issues on which availability of the writ of coram fIObia
turns may be decided on the basis of memoranda of points and
authorities, affidavits, and other written reports j where the
court deems additional procedures necessary to
determine the issues, it may also require the presence
petitioner and other witnesses and conduct the hearing as
ordinary trial.
[6] !d.-Writ of Error Ooram Nobis-Proceedings.-Neither the
U.S. Constitution nor California law require that the hearing .
on petition for a writ of coram nobis be conducted as a formal .
trial.
[1] See Oal.Jur.2d, Coram Nobis, § 11 j Am.Jur.2d, Coram Nobis~l
and Allied Statutory Remedies, § 13.
'~
lI/[cK.. Dig. References: [1, 2] Criminal Law, § 1038.5(1) j [3, 5]:~
Criminal Law, § 1038.7(1) j [4] Criminal Law, §§ 1038.7(1), ;
1038.7(6) j [6] Criminal Law, § 1038(2) j [7] Criminal Law,;
§ 1038(1) j [8] Criminal Law, § 1038.7(7); [9-13] Criminal Law,;
§ 1038.7(8) j [14, 15] Criminal Law, § 1038.5(3) j [16] Criminal.
Law, § 1038.7(3).
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[6] ld.-Writ of Error Coram Nobis-Nature of Writ.-Coram
fIObis must be regarded as part of the proceedings in the
criminal ease.
(7] ld.-Writ of Error Coram Nobis.-Coram nobis is an established remedy for challenging a criminal conviction.
[8] ld.-Writ of Error Coram Nobis-Review.-When a state affords a direct or collateral remedy to attack a criminal conviction, it cannot invidiously discriminate between rich and
poor; and an indigent defendant is entitled to an adequate
record on appeal, not only from a judgment of conviction, but
from the denial of a petition for a writ of error coram nobis.
[9] ld.-Writ of Error Coram Nobis-Appointment of CounselIndigent Derendants.-The questions that may be raised on
coram nobis are as crucial as those on direct appeal, for which
an indigent defendant is entitled as of right to appointed
counsel the first time, and it may not be held thr.t appointmcnt
of counsel for an indigent defendant in coram nobis rests solely
in the court's discretion. (Disapproving People v. Fowler,
175 Cal.App.2d 808 [346 P.2d 792J; People v. Waldo,224 Cal.
App.2d 542 [36 Cal.Rptr. 868J; People v. Blevins, 222 Cal.
App.2d 801 [35 Cal.Rptr. 438, 36 Cal.Rptr. 199], and People v.
Miller, 219 Cal.App.2d 124 [32 Cal.Rptr. 660] to the extent
that they suggest that the appointment of counsel is always
discretionary, and People v. Romano, 223 Cal.App.2d 216 [35
CaI.Rptr.756].)
[10] Id.-Writ of Error Coram NobiS-ApPointment of CounselIndigent Defendants.-A state may adopt reasonable standards
to govern the right to counsel in coram nobis proceedings.
[11] ld.-Writ of Error Coram Nobis-Appointment of CounselIndigent Defendants.-Standards governing the right to counsel
in coram nobis proceedings may preclude absolute equality to
the indigent, but absolute equality is not required; only invidious discrimination denies equal protection.
[12&,12b] ld. - Writ of Error Coram Nobis - Appointment of
Counsel-Indigent Pefendants.-As a condition to the appointment of counsel, an indigent petitioner for a writ of coram
nobis must allege with particularity the facts upon which he
would have a final judgment overturned and must disclose fully
his reasons for any delay in the presentation of those facts;
and in the absence of adequate factual allegations stating a
prima .facie case, counsel need not be appointed either in the
trial court or on appeal from a sUlllmary denial of relief in that
court.
[13] Id.-Writ of Error Coram Nobis-Appointment of CounselIndigent Defendants.-Whcn an indigent petitioner for a writ
of coram nobis has stated facts sufficient to satisfy the court
that a hesrin:; i~ requirro, hi~ claim clm no longer be treateo
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as frivolous, and he is entitled to have counsel appointed t-;)'\
represent him. If relief is denied after the hearing by the trial \
court, he is entitled to counsel on appeal, but if appointed;
counsel conscientiously concludes that there are no meritorious!
grounds of appeal, and the appellate court from its review is ':
satisfied that counsel's assessment of the record is correct,
it need not appoint ot1er counsel.
[14] Id.-Writ of Error Coram Nobis-Grounds-InsanitY.-The
trial court did not err in setting for hearing a petition for writ
of coram nobis where defendant admitted shooting two police
officers but alleged that he was then "hopped up" on benzedrine
and legally insane and that he did not present the defense of
insanity, being insane when he pleaded guilty, where these
allegations were supported by sworn statements from associates, and where the prison p~ychiatrist concluded that defendant suffered from toxic psychosis as a result of overdoses
of benzedrine and that the toxic state existed prior to and
during the act for which defendant was convieted.
[15] Id.-Writ of Error Coram Nobis-Grounds-Insanity.-Allegations, if true, that defendant was legally insane at the time
of his crime and that he failed to present the defense of insanity, being insane at the time he pleaded guilty, meet the
requirements for a writ of coram nobis.
[16] Id.-Writ of Error Coram Nobis-Time for ApplicationDiligence.-It could not be said that defendant lacked diligence
in discovering the facts on which he relied for relief where he
may have failed to present facts supporting an insanity plea
through no fault of his own, and his petition for a writ of
coram nobis was presented within 10 months after his judgment of conviction.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Orange
County denying a petition for a writ of error coram nobis.
Robert P. Kneeland, Judge. Reversed with directions.
Paul Ackerman, under appointment by the Supreme Court,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Stanley Mosk and Thomas C. Lynch, Attorneys General,
William E. James, Assistant Attorney General, and George
J. Roth, peputy A ttorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, C. J.-In February, 1962, defendant was
charged by information with two assaults with a deadly
weapon upon peace officers engaged in the performance of
<
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their duties. 1 (Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (b)~) The trial court
appointed the public defender to represent him, and he entered pleas of guilty. On March 9, the court entered a judgment of conviction and sentenced him to prison. The trial
judge and the district attorney recommended psychiatric care.
(Pen. Code, § 1203.01.) Defendant did not appeal.
In January 1963, defendant, in propria persona, mailed a
'petition for writ of error coram nobis to the trial court.2 The
petition alleges that defendant was insane at the time of the
offense, but did not present this defense because he was also
insane at the time of the plea. Defendant requested that he
be present at the hearing and that counsel be appointed to
represent him. The trial court filed the petition in August
and denied these requests. It did not, however, deny the petition summarily, but set it for hearing. Defendant then wrote
to the trial court repeating his requests, but no action was
taken on this letter.
The hearing was .continued from time to time until October
25, 1963. During this period the public defender appeared
for defendant on three occasions when continuances were
ordered, and assisted him in filing affidavits and a report of
an examination by the prison psychiatrist. The court refused,
however, to appoint the public defender to represent defendant. The People filed affidavits and a memorandum of points
and authorities in opposition to the petition. When the petition finally came on for hearing, defendant was neither present nor represented by counsel. The court complimented the
deputy district attorney on his memorandum of points and·
authorities and denied defendant's petition. Defendant appealed, and the District Court of Appeal for the Fourth Appellate District appointed counsel to represent him. Thereafter it reversed the order and remanded the case to the trial
court with instructions to appoint counsel to represent defendant in the coram nobis proceedings. We granted the
Attorney General's petition for hearing to consider recurring
questions involving the right to counsel in coram nobis cases.
(See People v. Fowler, 175 Cal.App.2d 808 [346 P.2d 792] ;
People v. Waldo, 224 Cal.App.2d 542 [36 Cal.Rptr. 868];
lCharges, based on the same ~vents, that defendant committed two
assaults with intent t.o kill (Pen. Code, § 217), were dismissed. The
information also charged, and defendant admitted, a prior felony conviction.
2In California, this petition is the equivalent of a motion to vacate
the judgment. (See People v. Tuthill, 32 Cal.2d 819, 821 [198 P.2d
505].)
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People v. Romano, 223 CalApp.2d 216 [35 Cal.Rptr. 756J;
People v. Blevins, 222 Cal.App.2d 801 [35 Cal.Rptr. 438, 36 .
Cal.Rptr. 191]; People v. Miller, 219 Cal.App.2d 124 [32.
Cal.Rptr. 660].)
[la] The writ of coram nobis is granted only when three·
requirements are met. (1) Petitioner must "show that some
fact existed which, without any fault or negligence on his
part, was not presented to the court at the trial on the merits, ;
and which if presented would have prevented the rendition .
of the judgment. " (People v. M en dei, 28 Cal.2d 686, 688 [171
P.2d 425] ; accord, People v. Tuthill, 32 Cal.2d 819, 821 [198
P.2d 505] ; People v. Reid, 195 Cal. 249, 255 [232 P. 457, 86
A.L.R. 1485].) (2) Petitioner must also show that the "newly
discovered evidence . . . [does not go] to the merits of issues
tried; issues of fact, once adjudicated, even though incorrectly, cannot be reopened except on motion for new trial"
(People v. Tuthill, 82 Cal.2d 819, 822 [198 P.2d 505] ; accord,
In re L£ndley, 29 Cal2d 709, 725-726 [177 P.2d 918] ; People
v. Paysen, 13 Cal.App. 896, 402 [11 P.2d 431].) [2] This
second requirement applies even though the evidence in question is not discovered until after the time for moving for a
new trialhas elapsed or the motion has been denied. (People
v. Reid, 195 Cal. 249, 258 [282 P. 457, 86 A.L.R. 1485];
PeopZe v. Coz, 18 Cal.App.2d 288, 286 [68 P.2d 849].)
[lb] (8) Petitioner "must show that the facts upon which he
relies were not known to him and could not in the exercise of
due diligence have been discovered by him at any time substantially earlier than the time of his motion for the writ.
. • ." (PeopZe v. Shorts, 82Cal.2d 502, 518 [197 P.2d 880] ;
accord, People v. W dch, 61 Ca1.2d 786, 791 [40 Cal.Rptr.
288, 394 P.2d 926].)
In view of these strict requirements, it will often be readily
apparent from the petition and the court's own records that
a petition for coram nobis is without merit and should there- .
fore be summarily denied. [3] When, however, facts have
been alleged with sufficient particularity (see In re Swain,
34 Ca1.2d 300, 804 [209 P.2d 798]) to show that there are
substantial legal or factual issues on which availability of
the writ turns, the court must set the matter for hearing.
[4] These issues may be decided on the basis of memoranda
of points and authorities, affidavits, and other written reports. If the court deems additional procedures necessary
to a correct determination of the issues, it may also require
the presence of petitioner and other witnesses, and conduct

1
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the hearing like an ordinary trial. (People v. Gennaitte, 127
Cal.App.2d 544, 548-549 [274 P.2d 169]; People v. Kirk,
76 Cal.App.2d 496, 498 [173 P.2d 367].) [5] Neither the
United States Constitution nor California law, however, requires that the hearing be conducted as a formal trial. (Hysler
v. Flor1c,a, 315 U.S. 411, 417 [62 S.Ct. 688, 86 L.Ed. 932];
Taylor v. Alabama, 335 u.s. 252, 263 [68 S.Ct. 1415, 92
L.Ed. 1935]; see People v. Adamson, 34 Ca1.2d 320, 330
[210 P.2d 13].) It is in the light of this procedural background that we must determine when counsel should be appointed to represent an indigent petitioner.
The Attorney General contends that coram nobis is a civil
remedy and that therefore appointment of counsel is not
mandatory. (See People v. Fowler, 175 Cal.App.2d 808, 810
[346 P.2d 792].) [6,7] Whatever the label, however, coram
7lobis "must be regarded as part of the proceedings in the
criminal case . . . " (In re Paiva, 31 Ca1.2d 503, 510 [190
P.2d 604]), and it is an established remedy for challenging a
criminal conviction. (See id, at p. 505; In re Horowitz, 33
Ca1.2d 534, 537 [203 P.2d 513]; 51 Cal.L.Rev. 970, 978.)
[8] It is now settled that whenever a state affords a direct
or collateral remedy to attack a criminal conviction, it cannot
invidiously discriminate between rich and poor. An indigent
defendant is entitled to an adequate record on appeal not
only from a judgment of conviction (Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 [76 S.Ct. 585, 100 L.Ed. 891, 55 A.L.R.2d
1055); Eskridge v. Washington State Board etc. Paroles, 357
U.S. 214 [78 S.Ct. 1061, 2 L.Ed.2d 1269}; Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 [83 S.Ct. 774, 9 L.Ed.2d 899], but
from the denial of a petition for a writ of coram nobis (Lane
v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 [83 S.Ct. 768, 9 L.Ed.2d 892]; see
McCrary v. Indiana, 36:,1: U.S. 277 [80 S.Ct. 1410,4 L.Ed.2d
1706]). [9] Although the United States Supreme Court
has not held that due process or equal protection requires
appointment of counsel to present collateral attacks on
convictions, it has held that counsel must be appointed to
represent the d,.efendant on his first appeal as of right. (Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 [83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d
811].) Since the questions that may be raised on coram
nobis are as crucial as those that may be raised on direct
appeal, the Douglas case precludes our holding that appointment of counsel in coram nobis proceedings rests solely in the
discretion of the court.
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[10] A state may, however, adopt reasonable standards to I,
govern the right to counsel in coram nobis proceedings.
[11] These standards may preclude absolute equality to thel
indigent, but, as the United States Supreme Court pointed
out in the Douglas case,absolute equality is not required;
only "invidious discrimination" denies equal protection.
(Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-357 [83 S.Ct.
814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811].) [12] Thus, in In re Nash, 61
Ca1.2d 491, 496 [39 Cal.Rptr. 205, 393 P.2d 405], we held
that an appellant was not subject to invidious discrimination
when neither his appointed counsel nor the District Court of
Appeal could discover a meritorious ground of appeal and the
court refused to appoint another counsel to represent him.
In habeas corpus cases we require a convicted defendant to
allege with particularity the facts upon which he would have
a final judgment overturned and to disclose fully his reasons
for any delay in the presentation of those facts. (In re
Swain, 34 Ca1.2d 300, 304 [209 P.2d 793].) We then examine
his allegations in the light of any matter of record pertaining
to his case (see California Rules of Court, rule 60) to determine whether a hearing should be ordered. We recognize
that these rules, applicable as well to petitions for coram nobis,
place indigent petitioners in a less advantageous position
than those with funds to retain counsel and employ investigators. It bears emphasis, however, that the ordinary processes of trial and appeal are presumed to result in valid
adjudications. Unless we make the filing of adequately detailed factual allegations stating a prima facie case a condition to appointing counsel, there would be no alternative but
to require the state to appoint counsel for every prisoner who
asserts that there may be some possible ground for challenging
his conviction. Neither the United States Constitution nor
the California Constitution compels that alternative. Accordingly, in the absence of adequate factual allegations stating a prima facie case, counsel need not be appointed either'
in the trial court or on appeal from a summary denial of relief
in that court.
[13] When, however, an indigent petitioner has stated
facts sufficient to satisfy the court that a hearing is required,
his claim can no longer be treated as frivolous and he is entitled to have counsel appointed to represent him. If relief is denied after the hearing, he is entitled to counsel on
appeal subject to the limitations set forth in the Nash case,
supra, 61 Ca1.2d 491, for the issues involved may be as sub-
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stantial as those that may be raised on appeal from a judgment of conviction. 8
[14] In the present case, the trial court found that a hearing was required. Defendant admits shooting two police
officers who were questioning him in connection with his
abandoned car, but contends that he was "hopped up" on
benzedrine tablets and that he had slept for only brief periods
during the preceding nine days. Hence, defendant contends,
lle was legally insane at the time of the crime. He alleges
that he failed to present the defense of insanity because he
was also insane at the time that he pleaded guilty. These
allegations are supported by sworn statements from associates
that defendant customarily drugged himself heavily with
benzedrine and that he suffered from delusions of police
persecution. The report of the prison psychiatrist also concludes that defendant was suffering from " toxic psychosis
because of massive overdoses of benzedrine and that this toxic
state existed prior to and during the acts for which he was
convicted.
Although the psychiatrist's report casts some doubt on
whether the effects of the drug were present at the time defendant pleaded guilty, we cannot say that the trial court
erred in setting the petition for hearing. [15] Defendant's
allegations, if true, would meet the requirements for a writ of
coram nobis. His legal sanity at the time of the crime is a
material question that was neither put in issue nor tried. (Pen.
Code, § 1016; People v. Welch, 61 Cal.2d 786, 794 [40 Cal.
Rptr. 238, 394 P.2d 926J.) [16] Furthermore, if he was in:.
capable of participating in the formulation of his defense,
defendant may have failed to present facts supporting an insanity plea through no fault of his own. Finally, the petition
was presented witllin 10 months from the judgment, and we
cannot say that defendant was not diligent in discovering the
facts upon which he relies.
The order denying coram nobis is reversed Rnd the cause
8To the extent that People v. Fowler, 175 Cal.App.2d 808 [346 P.2d
792], People v. Waldo, 224 Cal.App.2d 542 [36 Cal.Rptr. 868], People
v. BlcviftB, 222 Ca1.App.2d 801 {S5 Cal.Rptr. 438, 36 Cal.Rptr. 199], and
People v. Miller, 219 Cal.App.2d 124 [32 Cal.Rptr. 660], involved peti·
tions that did not state facts sum.cient to require a hearing, they are
not inconsistent with this opinion. To the extent that they suggest that
the appointment of eounsel is always discretionary, they are disapproved.
People v. Bomallo, 223 Cal.App.2d 216 (35 Cal.Rptr. 756], is likewise dis·
approved.
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remanded with instructions to appoint counsel and proceed
with a hearing on the merits of the petitiQn.

, t,

McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., Burke,
and Schauer, J.,. concurred.

i:;,
<,

